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The Case Against the Democratic Influence 
of the Internet on Journalism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The past decade has seen myriad claims of the democratising potential of the Internet in 
general, and in particular of the possibility for mass, non-professional, online media 
production1. The thrust of these claims range from the enhanced opportunities for 
citizenship (Coleman 2005) and the dismantling of elite gatekeeping structures and 
hierarchies (Delli Carpini and Williams 2001; Lievrouw and Livingstone 2006) to the 
egalitarianism of horizontal networks (Bentivegna 2002) and improved oversight of 
mainstream politics and media (Drezner and Farrell 2004; Cornfeld 2005; Regan 2004). 
Democratization is, needless to say, a highly contested term. It will be used here to 
designate not the advance of normative principles of equality, freedom or justice, but simply 
agency to effect change in the public realm. The definition of publicness is also very 
debatable; here it refers to any arena in which issues of shared concern are contested and 
negotiated (Couldry et al 2007: 6-7) – it is not limited to traditional political institutions or 
Habermas’s rational public sphere. In this chapter I argue that the democratising potential 
of online interaction, and blogging in particular, has been overstated by academic critics, 
policy makers and media professionals alike. This will involve suggesting different ways of 
theorising online media production, though it will also draw at least tangentially upon three 
very different pieces of research: a large-scale UK project investigating the relationship 
between people’s sense (or absence) of media and public connection (Couldry et al 2007), a 
qualitative analysis of symbolic economies of professional identity amongst UK and US 
journalists (Markham 2007), and an exploratory survey of a selection of opinion blogs. 
Blogging is conceived methodologically in Bourdieusian terms as a field of cultural 
production, characterized by field positions differentiated according to forms and volumes 
of symbolic capital and by the collective misrecognition (though there is also evidence of 
reflexivity) amongst bloggers and media analysts of the ‘rules of the game’; in particular, 
what constitutes authority in the blogosphere. It is suggested that blogging may be 
connected phenomenologically (rather than politically) to the ‘culture of narcissism’ thesis, 
and the implications in terms of field autonomy of an increasingly self-referencing 
blogosphere are considered. 
 
Any argument that posits blogging as a democratising influence on journalism risks 
committing the fallacy of casting in political terms what is instead a cultural phenomenon. 
The mainstreaming of this form of cultural production (which, given research into the 
endurance of the digital divide, must be regarded as a limited universalization) should not 
be seen as a natural political good, but instead simply as a horizontal proliferation. 
Hierarchical proliferation of news production, although it by definition entails a defence of 
elitism, can be defended on the grounds that it is only by the maintenance of a restricted 
space of production that certain cultural forms are possible. This is not to suggest that 
hierarchical structures in journalism should be treated as sacred. Instead, the necessity of 
hierarchy as a general principle should be defended, while the specific forms that 
hierarchization takes should be made transparent and contested. This means that rather 
than depicting blogging as a force opposing cultural consecration – that is, the collective 
valorisation of particular symbolic forms according to mainstream or institutional
  
principles of differentiation – and the subsequent reproduction of unequal power relations 
in journalism, we should accept the necessity of rarefied spaces of journalistic production 
and instead turn our attention to exposing the strategies and criteria by which these 
positions are defined and occupied. 
 
The chapter also makes a broader claim about the democratic limits of online practices of 
citizenship: in short, interaction in itself is of no political value if that interaction, in the 
words of one interviewee, ‘doesn’t go anywhere’. Further, there is evidence of a significant 
minority which is ‘already turned away’ (Couldry et al 2007) from both media and public 
engagement, and the Internet cannot, and should not, be expected to correct disconnection 
and broader alienation. (These claims run parallel to the arguments against policies of 
social inclusion which fail to answer either of the questions of ‘inclusion in what?’ and ‘for  
what purpose?’). Arguments for the democratising influence of blogging on journalism rely 
on a questionable premise of personalized authenticity, by which authority is perceived to 
consist in the genuineness with chich a claim is make rather than according to some 
external frame of reference, and wrongly presume that political efficacy logically follows 
from freedom of expression. Our attentions – as both academics and bloggers – would be 
more effectively directed at the mechanisms which sustain the hierarchies and dominant 
symbolic forms of journalism today (rather than opposing such structures outright), and at 
the political forces – rather than cultural or media phenomena – which undermine 
democratic engagement. 
 
 
Theorising Online Media Production with Bourdieu 
 
One of the principal weaknesses in the claim that the Internet is a democratising influence 
on journalism is the assumption that the Internet is a political arena. I argue below that the 
Internet should be seen as political in the sense that it can be partly characterized as a field 
of struggle, rather than a neutral space of communication providing the basis for 
collaborative engagement. This, however, is distinct from depicting the Internet as a 
political field as such, i.e. one whose essence, if not reality, is conflict and negotiation over 
issues of shared concern. Rather, in Bourdieusian terms, it is best defined as a field of 
cultural production,2 which subsists in the metafield of power, but is distinct from the field 
of politics and operates relatively, if weakly, autonomously. This means that online 
interaction proceeds to a significant extent according to the Internet’s internal rules of 
engagement, driven by an emerging etiquette. That said, those external principles affecting 
the Internet (the broader cultural context, the regulatory structure of the news media, 
market economics and so on) must also be taken into account. This is not to suggest that 
only traditional arenas should count as ‘political’ – countless viable alternative political 
spaces, from community media activism to online organising and campaigning networks 
have been identified (see for instance Downing 2001; Kahn & Kellner 2004). But what these 
arenas share is a common dominant set of principles of ‘vision and division’ – the key 
differentiating factors by which value is ascribed to symbolic capital. Such principles are 
associated with normative and historical factors including public and social institutions, and 
embedded modes of practice internalized and instinctively recognised as political. These 
discursively instituted modes of interaction and communication are not intrinsically 
legitimate but achieve a contingent stability as political practice through repeated 
enactment and historicity: namely, contestation, campaigning and mobilisation over civil, 
economic and potentially cultural rights. There is nothing naturally superior about these: 
indeed, from the Bourdieusian perspective, it is presumed that the internalization and 
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naturalization of such norms proceeds alongside a systematic misrecognition of other, more 
insidious, economies of power. 
 
To characterize the Internet as a field of cultural production, then, is not to say it is a 
degraded political sphere, as much as it is not in itself a new and improved politics. While 
practices of citizenship do of course take place online, there is nothing about new 
communication technologies which are naturally democratising: they operate according to a 
set of principles which are distinct from the field of politics and should be understood on 
their own terms. That is, the elements which constitute the lifeworld3 of the Internet – 
discourse, identity, norms of practice, anticipation, creativity, professionalism, amateurism, 
instinct etc – are determined fundamentally differently than in those of other lifeworlds in 
which the centrality (if not specific form) of political norms such as citizenship, 
democratization, coercion, justice, domination, and so on has long been established. This is 
in itself problematic, but the point is that such critical problematization is both possible and 
widely practiced; the practically universalized dominant principles of politics are routinely 
challenged and picked apart. However, to conceive of the Internet in such terms is to forgo 
the critical assessment of its own principles of differentiation. This is not to suggest that the 
blogosphere is internally coherent and strongly autonomous from other fields, but as a 
distinct subfield of cultural production it should be thought of as structured according to 
adaptable, durable logics which are different from those of adjacent and intersecting fields. 
And given the sheer speed with which such principles and norms have become effectively 
natural and universal, it seems particularly important that we understand the contingent 
generative structures of this quasi-autonomous lifeworld. To import criteria from other 
fields with their own internal logics is to neglect the logics of determination of symbolic 
value in online communication – logics which are doubtless contingent upon specific social, 
historical and political conditions of possibility. 
 
What does it mean then to characterize the Internet as a field of cultural production related 
to, but also partially autonomous from, other fields? First, like any field, it should be thought 
of as simultaneously structured and structuring: there is no virtual world characterized by 
competing but unresolved theories of its existence, rather there is a symbolic world (like 
others) manifesting a particular determination of a range of possible worlds. It is for this 
reason that we should not see any field of cultural production as being comprehensible only 
in its own terms, or as essentially arbitrary in relation to the economic and social contexts in 
which it subsists. (And by structuring, online media production should be conceived as 
having determining functions beyond the field of its genesis – including in what I have 
identified here as the public arena). In practical terms, this means that we can certainly 
interpret changes in journalistic practice and consumption in political terms, without 
extrapolating that either there is a corresponding determination upon the political field, or 
that new structures of journalism themselves have a political teleology, or final end goal or 
purpose. These new structures are particular expressions of generative logics: this means 
that their political determination is reasonable without being predictable, and that their 
determining effects will sometimes, haphazardly, include practices of democratization, 
without such determinations ‘completing’ those structures. 
 
By way of (admittedly imperfect) analogy, let us consider Bourdieu’s critique of opinion 
polling as a democratising force in politics. The problem with claims made on the basis of 
polling, for Bourdieu, is that they misrepresent as political that which should be regarded as 
cultural. In short, the value of an opinion poll is contingent upon a culturally dominant 
principle of differentiation – popularity – and as such it should not be conflated with 
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political, and specifically democratising, criteria (Bourdieu 1994). To reiterate, this is not to 
suggest the superiority of (traditional) criteria for ascribing political symbolic value, nor to 
suggest that politics exists in a vacuum. But importing exogenous principles of domination 
undermines in the same blow both the iniquities and benefits of a field historically 
operating with a significant degree of autonomy. Further, those criteria do not have the 
same meaning when applied in different contexts (Matheson 2004), and their normalization 
in another field may proceed only through the misrecognition of specific political 
conditionalities. For example, the idea that the multiplication of sources of information 
online represents a democratization of knowledge conflates the criteria of freedom and 
choice. Likewise, ascribing value according to popularity – as is the norm for the majority of 
search engines – can lead to the conflation of competitive success and political mandate. (It 
has also been argued that the personalisability of search engines indicates the increasing 
prevalence of a discourse of individualization; see Carlson 2007b). Further, the proliferation 
of media producers online may be interpreted as culturally empowering, but to assert that 
this is a politically democratising function is to make commitments to specific 
interpretations of representation and self-determination – which are by no means 
uncontested within the realm of political debate. The danger is that if such specific values 
are normalized then their exogenous origins will go increasingly unrecognized, along with 
the normative commitments they may entail. I would suggest that such culturally 
determined criteria may include a politics of competitive individualism – not that this is 
necessarily indefensible, but that the colonization by this logic of other fields may 
contribute to its decontestation and dominance in political and other spheres of interaction. 
 
 
Foucault, Habermas and the Defence of Hierarchy 
 
A second and related way of theorising the massification of media production is to 
characterize it, after Foucault, as the incitement of discourse. For Foucault, power operates 
not (only) through negative injunction – explicit constraints on freedom of speech, say, or 
restrictive social norms – but through ‘positive’, stimulatory mechanisms. Psychiatry, for 
instance, does not wield coercive power by broadly prohibiting behaviour, but by 
encouraging individuals to talk – leading to sense being made of behaviour in terms of a 
discourse which categorizes, rationalizes and pathologizes. Likewise, from a Foucaultian 
perspective, increasingly prevalent representations of sexuality in the media (in women’s 
magazines, for instance) should not be interpreted as liberating, but as discursive 
production which acts as a form of discipline by inciting structured internal monologues in 
individuals. Instead of regarding media production as the realization of some latent or 
natural desire for self-expression made possible by new communication technologies, this 
approach sees the ‘will to blog’ as the product of cultural, economic and political forces. 
These might include a culture of narcissism, consumerist production of desire or the 
technological genesis of cultural practices – though in each case there are allegations of 
determinism to answer. At the more conspiratorial end of Foucaultian thinking, this may 
amount to interpreting any apparently unstructured proliferation of expression as evidence 
of new regimes of discipline, especially the instigation of internal discourses that regulate 
the individual. The blogosphere thus represents neither a democratized public sphere 
providing the preconditions for unfettered rational discourse, nor a top-down imposition of 
power by political or corporate elites, but the inculturation of norms whose coercive 
political effects are masked by their appearance as will and instinct, and whose durability is 
masked by their being re-presented as new norms. The appearance of novelty is associated 
with a cultural form which is under-determined (that is, relatively freer from structural 
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determination), masking the common determining structures which have given rise equally 
to media forms new and old. (The same logic might be argued to apply to ‘citizen 
journalism’, or public participation in mainstream news production; see for instance Deuze, 
Bruns, & Neuberger 2007). Brian McNair (2003) usefully distinguishes between the control 
and chaos paradigms of media politics, though by characterising chaos as a lack of 
(authoritarian) control there is an implicit equating of chaos and freedom in his model. 
While a norm of unruliness as central to a healthy democracy is certainly defensible, the 
Foucaultian position emphasizes the ongoing need to identify patterns of political 
determination in seeming disorder. After Giddens (1984), individuals do not act with 
voluntaristic agency; nor are they mere structural effects. Behaviour is structured by rules, 
resources, relationships and authority, yet the ongoing existence of these is predicated on 
their production and reproduction in social interaction. Accordingly, changing practices do 
lead to changes in rules, but should be seen as re-structuratuion rather than de-
structuration. New practices do not indicate an absence of determination, but a different 
determination, which in this context and boils down to asking what determines identity, 
orientation, behaviour and action in an arena such as the blogosphere, and who benefits 
from its mainstreaming.  
 
To characterize the Internet as not naturally democratising does not then equate to seeing it 
as an ideological state apparatus whose political functions of controlling citizens and 
reproducing hierarchies precede its use as a means of address, reception and interaction. 
The restructuration that journalism has been through over the past ten years does not 
represent an inexorable path towards increased coercion operating largely unnoticed. 
Restructuration does involve changes (and continuities) at the macro level, while the 
microscopic ‘intimate structuration’ to which Foucaultian theory lends itself does not reside 
only in the realm of the intangible. The task of the theorist is to illuminate the conditions of 
possibility, constraints and contingencies misinterpreted as unremarkable and unintended 
consequences of newly emerging restructured symbolic economies. This is entirely 
consistent with recognising that the Internet does provide an arena in which large numbers 
of individuals can communicate, notwithstanding the enduring caveat of the digital divide, 
much discussed elsewhere (see for instance Norris 2000; Norris 2001; Lievrouw and 
Livingstone 2003; Rice and Haythornthwaite 2006). But relative freedom of communication 
is not in itself a sufficient criterion of democratization. Even if we characterize the Internet 
pace Habermas primarily as a field of communication, we are not bound to the narrow 
premise that communication is foremost a matter of deliberation towards an agreed 
endpoint. In short, if we take a Bourdieusian rather than a Habermasian perspective, the 
Internet should be characterized at least partly as a field of struggle or practical strategy. 
Strategy here does not refer to the political potential of the Internet in terms of its efficacy 
in furthering the interests of political ideologies and movements. Rather, it refers to the 
political determination of the terms of communication, as well as authority, authenticity and 
so on: communication should be regarded as a structured set of embodied practices 
oriented towards some kind of gain beyond that which the communicative act announces. 
Interaction between bloggers and their peers and readers then may serve to obscure an 
underlying symbolic economy in which competition for misrecognized forms of capital 
proceeds; I consider below the possibility that systematically misrecognized authority and 
authenticity underpins struggles over status. 
 
If this seems overly conspiratorial, and if the mere fact of expression or interaction is to be 
rejected as a sufficient condition of democratization, then the Habermasian alternative – a 
structured discourse with established rules of engagement and means of ascribing merit – 
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will need to be defended or developed (Bohman 2007). This means defending a system of 
media production which variously describable as elitist, institutional and bourgeois: that is, 
professional journalism. And while journalism’s role as a democratic force in late capitalist 
societies depends on a code of practice enshrining a set of ethical principles adherence to 
which is accountable to peers or external regulatory bodies, it is demonstrable that the 
implementation of and reflection on those ethics are themselves effective means by which 
journalism’s gatekeeping structures and internal hierarchies are preserved. In short, 
journalists’ ethical practice and the way they talk about the ethical dimension of journalism 
has the effect of mystifying what it takes to be a good (and ethical) journalist (Matheson 
2003), and this is antidemocratic in the sense that this process serves as a barrier against 
entry into the journalistic field – and there is no shortage of evidence that the demographic 
failing to break into professional journalism over-represents minorities, women and people 
of low socioeconomic status (see for instance Sutton Trust 2006; Chambers et al 2004). 
 
As such, the deprofessionalization of journalism for which new communication technologies 
are in part responsible might be welcomed as a good thing. Sociologists since Johnson 
(1972) have argued that professional identities and norms have more to do with the 
universalization of professional ideologies and the power relations they concretize than 
safeguards of best professional practice (see also Deuze 2005). However, in line with the 
point made about restructuration above, deprofessionalization should be seen as replacing 
one set of criteria with another rather than simply doing away with dominant criteria. Like 
other fields of cultural production, this new journalism – however restructured – would be 
expected to run between two poles: broadly speaking, elitist and mass culture. What 
Bourdieu terms the pole of unrestricted cultural production is associated with specific 
criteria for ascribing value – in particular popularity, though analysis of print journalism 
suggests other plausible examples of valorized symbolic capital operating at this pole 
including authenticity (see below), moralism and underdog status (see also Conboy 2006). 
My own research (2007) indicates that the elite pole is associated with traditional 
journalistic values such as autonomy, integrity and objectivity, though there are further 
largely misrecognized values including cynicism and ambivalence towards power at work. 
Importantly, while it is true that the criteria associated with the pole of restricted 
production are peer-defined and serve the interests of established professional journalists, 
it is also only at this pole that certain forms of cultural production are possible. To be sure, 
this reasoning is more germane to a field such as scientific research, in which scientific peer 
review can be more easily seen as serving a properly democratic function of safeguarding 
the quality of knowledge defensibly regarded as being in the public interest. (Though 
Bourdieu also notes that even in the scientific field there are misrecognized economies at 
work which mask the strategising that underpins competition between scientists, namely 
the ‘interest in disinterest’ in financial gain). It is more problematic to apply this logic to 
journalism, but at least in the case of investigative journalism the reasoning is sound: it is a 
journalistic practice possible only at the pole of restricted production, and which, despite its 
insitutionalization and elitism, may serve a democratic function – say, holding power to 
account in a way that only a well-funded journalist, with experience of mixing in elite 
circles, and with ample time, could be expected to do (Lowrey 2006).4 
 
 
Journalistic Authority and the Contingency of Authenticity 
 
One of the most interesting developments is how quickly new norms of practice, identity 
and appearance have become established, and a political-phenomenological approach can 
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attempt to discern the processes of decontestation, naturalization and embodiment by 
which normalization proceeds. This is by no means methodologically uncomplicated, as it 
often means seeking to establish contingency where none is directly observable, but it does 
mean that we can ask on what grounds a particular piece of media content is perceived in 
certain definable contexts or amongst specific audiences as culturally valuable, or why a 
particular media producer is regarded as authoritative. Weber’s embodiment thesis is 
useful in this regard. Writing about the clergy, Weber argued that institutional religious 
practice is not perceived (by peers and public alike) as the successful performance of the 
acquired requisite skills of this field, but rather an  expression of personal character. 
Authority, then, consists not in the enactment of valorised practices but in their 
embodiment. Likewise, a journalist’s authority would be expected to be perceived by 
colleagues and audience in terms of personality or innate instinct, rather than the nature of 
skills executed or work produced (Markham 2007). But this talent, enacted and interpreted 
as deontological or moral obligation, can be ‘denaturalized’ or unpacked. For instance, in 
(supposed) contrast to elite journalists, it seems bloggers are frequently valorized (this is 
apparent especially in comments made by readers) for their common sense and plain-
speaking, presumably in opposition to the inauthenticity of the official language of 
politicians and the mainstream media (see also Robinson 2006). Theorists from Durkheim 
to Goffman have demonstrated the complex and conflicted configurations of 
decontestations, (re)significations and embedded practices upon which any recognisable 
form of common sense is predicated, and even if the more functionalist accounts of 
discursive hegemony are avoided (both Gramsci and Chomsky, for example, hold that the 
primary function of cultural forms is the reproduction of hierarchy, and any other functions 
of culture are essentially incidental. See Herman 1998), it remains valid to claim that 
common sense is a determination of specific social and political forces rather than 
something deontological. This is not to suggest that Internet media producers cannot speak 
sensibly, but rather that what counts as sensible is not universal but an alignment with the 
positions, orientations and trajectories of specific audiences or publics. This may not go 
further than the classic observation that people tend to read the newspaper that confirms 
their existing prejudices, but it does bear out the importance of decoupling common sense 
and democratization. It is certainly possible that wide recognition of a blogger’s tendency to 
‘speak sense’ equates to better media representation of the interests of media consumers 
than is offered by ‘traditional’ journalists, but it is also worth stressing that the relationship 
between media representation and democratic representation is highly contestable (Butsch 
2007). 
 
An exploratory qualitative analysis of attributions of value (is this a textual analysis of 
incidences of praise, concurrence etc?) across a month’s output in ten opinion blogs was 
undertaken to investigate this seeming personalization of values in attributions by and 
about opinion bloggers5. It concluded, tentatively, that authority is constituted through a 
variety of valorized symbolic forms including authenticity, common sense, logic, humour, 
knowledge, intelligence, autonomy and courageousness. This would suggest that it is 
difficult to maintain an artificial distinction between the substance of an Internet 
journalist’s output from the style and context of its expression. And it is especially notable 
that authority and authenticity appear to be significantly conflated (see also Livingstone 
1998). This, again, is not to suggest that media producers of every ilk are innately 
manipulative. But it is also important to take account of research that has looked at exactly 
how the authentic journalistic voice is constituted and received across various genres. Some 
of this goes on at the level of the Durkheimian nonconscious,6 and a Bourdieusian approach 
building on this would look at the conditions of possibility of the experienced natural fit 
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between the phenomenal object and subject (that is, what preconditions exist for it to feel 
natural for a journalist or blogger to write about a particular phenomenon in a certain way) 
and between the producer and her audience. It also goes on very much at the conscious 
level in journalistic training: there are widely acknowledged techniques (Conboy 2006, 
identifies informality, complicity, metaphors and humour among others) by which a 
journalist can encode a voice, which appears without artifice to a specific audience. While 
not automatically at odds, it bears emphasising that authenticity of voice is also a crucial 
strategy for getting ahead in the journalistic (or blogging) game. It has rapidly become 
unremarkable practice, not in all blogs needless to say, but certainly in the majority of those 
examined here, to include details (sometimes relevant, sometimes not) of the blogger’s 
tastes, mood and other aspects of an apparent internal monologue amongst external 
observations, which tend to take a fairly standard print journalistic form (Wall 2005). This 
can defensibly be construed as a performance of authenticity, or a claim, not necessarily 
conscious, to authority through endearment. Interestingly, and against Weber’s account of 
how individuals come to be seen as authoritative embodiments of the skills they enact, it is 
arguable that bloggers (also) accrue reputability through articulations of character 
unrelated to the external phenomena which form their analytic object – or even, in the case 
of three blogs studied here, through a self-effacing disavowal of authority. Of course, 
personal asides are a key aspect of blogging discourse, and provide respite from the 
strictures of traditional journalistic narrative. However, the dominance of such principles of 
differentiation as attribute norms risks substituting the performance of blogging (and 
interactions between bloggers) for its engagement with objects outside the blogosphere. It 
is this elevation of the personal, or more precisely a highly mutually referential group of 
individuals valued according to perceived personal character, which weighs against the 
collective addressing of issues of shared concern, which I have here set out as a necessary 
component of democratization. Personal sympathy and charisma have long been important 
factors of journalistic success in particular contexts; it is possible that their domination as 
criteria for judging journalistic worth, however, point towards a nascent culture of 
narcissism, narrowly defined, in shared blogging practices. 
 
 
Cultures of Narcissism? 
 
Christine Rosen has over the past decade sought to update Christopher Lasch’s ‘culture of 
narcissism’ thesis (Lasch 1978) and apply it to contemporary trends in education and 
parenting (Rosen 2005) and, most recently, social networking sites (Rosen 2007). In large 
part these are normative critiques of neo-liberal individualism, targeting especially the 
decline of personal responsibility, preoccupation with self-esteem and the broader therapy 
culture which Lasch saw as responses to the pervasive sense of insecurity experienced by 
increasingly atomized individuals. Writing about MySpace user profiles Rosen describes “an 
overwhelmingly dull sea of monotonous uniqueness, of conventional individuality, of 
distinctive sameness” (Rosen 2007: 24; see also Liu 2008), sensing behind the relentless 
drive towards cultural signification and projection of identity an impossibility of same. As 
regards blogging, it is tempting to use similarly normative allegations of self-indulgence and 
egoism to demonstrate, perhaps a little glibly, that present cultures of blogging are not 
compatible with democratic collectivism. A potentially more productive extension of 
Rosen’s argument is to link the idea of incitement to discourse mentioned above to a drive 
to relentless signification where Internet users are always-already alienated from the 
signifiers available to them. There is not space to develop this argument fully here, but it 
will suffice for present purposes to stress that if narcissism is a useful device for 
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interpreting cultures of practice in web journalism, it is not in its more rhetorical 
deployment but rather in a phenomenological sense. By this way of thinking, individual 
subjects seek identity in part through seeing themselves as others do – i.e. as objects. 
However, if the subject who engages with the world is in fact a homogenized collection of 
generic signifiers of subjectivity, then the already-alienated self who enacts these 
significations cannot attain identity with the self as reflected back by the social world. If 
Rosen’s argument is transposable from social networking sites to online deprofessionalized 
journalistic practices, then blogging represents a futile attempt at full subjectivity based on 
homogenized cultural forms; the self being reflected back by other journalists is similarly 
comprised of the arbitrary and alienating. And instead of simply demonstrating the 
existential impossibility of full subjectivity (and if it is impossible on phenomenological 
grounds, why would we expect the Internet to provide the solution?), subjectification as it 
specifically proceeds online instead can be seen to suffer, counter-intuitively, from under-
mediation (see also Couldry 2008). In reality it’s all too easy to project one’s subjectivity 
and to see oneself as reflected back by the Internet: it’s right there on the screen. But this 
represents a short-circuited subjectivity lacking mediation by other subjects. This is not to 
lionize an insupportable ideal of ‘real’ or ‘face-to-face’ interaction: the above Bourdieusian 
characterization of communication as politically complicit shows that no form of interaction 
is unproblematic, but each can be understood in terms of its own symbolic world. 
Phenomenologically, subjective identity cannot be an aim in itself; it arises only though 
mediation by other subjects and through acting in public spaces and, conservative as this 
might sound, institutions. Rosen’s interpretation of MySpace illustrates the degraded 
subjectivity, which can result from the prioritization of the projection of identity over 
interaction. Similarly, while blogging undeniably encourages a great deal of interaction, the 
dominance of the personal as criteria for recognising cultural value in the blogosphere, 
where the value of the personal is not pre-given but contingent upon the projection of 
systematically recognisable and hence homogenous signifiers of authenticity, likewise 
short-circuits the mediation of subjectivity. Such mediation does of course occur, and there 
is no sense in denying the extent of interactivity online – though there is some evidence that 
interactivity between journalists and their audience is overstated (Domingo 2008), and that 
blogging is more of a monologue than a dialogue (Wilhelm 2000). Where it does occur, 
public interaction, meaning that whose primary function is the contestation and negotiation 
of issues of shared concern, proceeds independently of any mooted collectivist teleology of 
the Internet, not because of it.  
 
 
The Objectivity Dilemma 
 
Knowledge about public issues has long been regarded as central to democratic politics, and 
more broadly to self-determination. It was noted earlier that Foucault’s problematization of 
the knowledge/power connection has specific implications for media disseminated online – 
namely that it can be argued to have a rationalising effect on media content and online 
identity, which in turn are claimed to have political effects. There is another concern, 
however, regarding the quality of information available rather than the politically complicit, 
structurally incited will to produce online content. This is not the place for a critique of the 
reliability of information published online – there is no shortage of such assessments after 
all – but there is a point to be made about how changes in the mode of production of 
journalistic content may impact on the democratic process. Nick Davies notes in his recent 
Flat Earth News (2008) that only twelve percent of the news articles he analysed contained 
evidence of original research – and he concludes that the main reason for this is that 
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journalists increasingly research stories online. (This is contestable, though, and several 
scholars have pointed to the countervailing potential for ‘citizen’ journalists’ use of 
alternative sources; see for example Deuze et al 2007; Rauch 2007). The upshot is that the 
information available to news consumers is increasingly filtered through secondary and 
tertiary sources, and this has potentially significant implications, beyond the immediate 
point that reliability is not enhanced as one would expect from a multiplication of sources, 
since that multiplication takes the form of an echo effect rather than substantively different 
origins of information and interpretation. 
 
One such implication leads us back to the Bourdieusian field model. If sources of news come 
increasingly from within the online arena, and the resulting news is recycled and 
reinterpreted, then there is a case for claiming that the Internet as a field of cultural 
production is increasingly governed by its internal logic rather than those of other fields. 
Different fields have varying levels of autonomy from other fields, and all, the Internet as 
much as any other, are increasingly subject to market demands. A highly autonomous field 
has the advantage of preserving its specialist modes of production (as in investigative 
journalism, above), but its ‘rules of the game’ – inevitably tied to the reproduction of 
hierarchies of power – are less susceptible to challenge. The journalistic field has 
historically been typified by gatekeeping structures, the mystification of journalistic 
practice and an inculturated professional ideology, all of which have the effect of preserving 
both the internal structures of the field and the broader social positioning of journalists. 
However, routine exposure to other fields has meant that the dominance of these internal 
logics has been tempered by the constant demonstration that, elsewhere, they are not 
regarded as natural or inevitable. In short, the recognition that things are done differently 
elsewhere means that the complete internalization of the rules of the journalistic game is 
effectively impossible. This tempering, though, comes through interaction with sources 
from different fields. Diminished exposure to external actors would be expected to lead to 
greater decontestation of the contingent norms of online journalism. This is not an 
argument that applies to the Internet in general, as to posit it, as a space insulated from the 
‘real’ world, is self-evidently indefensible. However, in journalistic terms, it is feasible that 
the circularity of interactions between journalists, bloggers and sources (who are 
frequently other journalists and bloggers) would lead to a more internally coherent and 
autonomous journalistic lifeworld, which would in turn serve as a more effective means of 
reproducing both the positive (restricted production) and negative (political relations 
internalized and forgotten as political) aspects of cultures of media production. 
 
Of course, this argument appears to validate the primary source (or in other words 
considers this abstraction as real to a degree). The implication is that for knowledge to be 
democratizing it has to be reliable, and reliability here is cast in strongly objectivist terms. It 
has been noted elsewhere that not only is objectivism an unachievable aim for journalists, it 
is used (consciously or otherwise) strategically by journalists competing with each other 
and cultural producers from other fields (Matheson 2003). This instrumentalist 
characterization of the journalist – as an intrepid hunter of facts –needs to be set alongside 
its centrality to cultural capital. It is also worth stressing that a journalist’s engagement with 
online sources need not be set in opposition to a face-to-face interview, or characterized as 
a degraded form of communication. However, without wishing to exaggerate the 
phenomenological experience of witnessing an event first hand, it is valid to set out a 
theoretical position consistent with the above characterization of fields of cultural 
production as neither arbitrary nor simply objectively determined. This means interpreting 
events in the field as reasonable – which is to say explicable but not predictable from 
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outside the field, rather than having meaning only within the field as a discrete world. This 
in turn leads to the proposition that while a multiplicity of perspectives is an essential 
component of the democratization of knowledge, it is important that these be regarded as 
different interpretations of the same external event or phenomena, rather than merely 
different cultural manifestations within a discrete symbolic world which cannot be critically 
assessed from without. If Davies is correct, the disconnection of journalists from primary 
sources could feasibly amount to a wider dislocation between the online journalistic world 
and the material context in which it subsists. 
 
 
Conclusion: How Should We Ascribe Political Meaning to Blogs? 
 
The symbolic value of online media production is by no means easy to define; it is ascribed 
collectively by individuals similarly oriented towards recognising certain cultural forms and 
people as valuable. This circularity means that instead of looking for the origins of value in 
the media form itself or in its audience, we should look instead at the generative criteria, 
which precede both production and reception. These can be thought of as being locatable 
according to two axes, one roughly characterized by popularity, the other by ‘volume’ of 
symbolic capital recognized or consecrated in given contexts. This boils down to a familiar 
distinction between types of cultural value – namely, between that whose value is 
predicated on broad popularity, and that whose perceived value exceeds its limited 
popularity, because of its association with elite, alternative or niche interests. The cultural 
value of most media content is of course determined by a combination of these two 
principles. What is important in the context of this chapter is to emphasise that neither 
criterion is naturally compatible or antithetical to democratization. I suggested earlier that 
size of audience does not itself entail democratization, or at least that it assumes a 
democratic model defined according to freedom of choice of consumption. Similarly, a blog 
popular with a narrow elite audience is not necessarily anti-democratic, as by the logic set 
out above it is possible that only in such an elite space of production that certain cultural 
forms, including those having democratising effects, however defined, are possible.  
 
There is not space here to develop a precise means of measuring the cultural value of a blog, 
but it is worth emphasising that different methodologies carry distinct political 
commitments and implications. For instance, the claim that expression of opinion is 
intrinsically politically valuable would suggest that no broader cultural value needs to be 
measured – this does logically follow, but represents either a narcissistic perspective or a 
merely formal political definition of political deliberation (much like Hegel’s identification 
of the inadequacy of formal citizenship in the absence of substantive engagement and 
recognition in political life) in which the act of expressing or participating is prioritized over 
questions of content and context. A common gauge of a blogger’s success is their uptake by 
media practitioners in the traditional field of political-cultural production – that is, 
politicians, think-tanks and media commentators (Carlson 2007a). However, this entails the 
perseverance of traditional journalism’s gatekeeping and hierarchical structures (Singer 
2005), which thus rules out the possibility of reforming the undemocratic tendencies of 
institutionalized journalism. There is no reason to think that these traditional structures 
would be opened or challenged by having new forms of media production feeding in: 
indeed, there is every reason to believe that existing structures, complicit as they are in 
reproducing hierarchies, are easily capable of assimilating new online discourses and, after 
Foucault, neutralising and rationalising them (Domingo 2008; Robinson 2006; Robinson 
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2007; Singer 2005). It does not follow that deprofessionalized media production feeding in 
to existing political structures will lead to their democratization.  
 
Likewise, if the democratising effect of the blogosphere is judged by the level of interaction 
it generates, this needs to be balanced against the argument that interaction itself is not in 
any sense democratising unless it leads to some form of action, deliberation or contestation 
outside the confines of this particular arena of cultural production. This is certainly in line 
with one of the tangential conclusions of the Public Connection research project.7 It found 
that, against the democratic potential of media interactivity championed by the BBC and 
others, for a significant number of media consumers interaction makes little difference to 
their sense of connection to or disconnection from any sort of public world, unless there is a 
sense that such interaction leads to influence or change in some form of public world 
beyond the arena of information exchange. In line with the digital divide arguments made 
by many scholars over the past decade, this research found that new media forms tend only 
to be taken up for political purposes by those who are already politically engaged (see also 
Levine and Lopez 2004). If an important aspect of democratization is encouraging 
participation, then this (admittedly limited) data suggests that the Internet will not lead 
those who are already turned away from public issues to engage politically online, whether 
through responding to existing online political content – which for our purposes was 
defined as referring to any issues of shared concern, however conceived – or producing 
their own. What’s more, the evidence suggests that we should not even necessarily want the 
Internet to encourage participation. This is not in the sense that, after Walter Lippmann 
(1925), citizens invariably engage haphazardly and on the basis of insufficient knowledge, 
and journalism should not be expected to educate people and thus correct the democratic 
deficit. Rather, our data indicated that for a significant minority disconnection is not 
experienced as problematic: some are happily turned away from any sort of mediated 
public world, and there is nothing the Internet can or should do about it. 
 
Ultimately, the question of the cultural value of a particular piece of online journalism is 
secondary to what such a measurement can tell us about the dominant principles of 
differentiation in a given cultural field, which in turn have only an indirect relation to 
broader democratic and antidemocratic forces. We should start from the principle that in 
order to understand the ‘meaning’ of a blog we have to take into account all those who have 
an interest in ascribing value. That is, as well as taking seriously (and distinctly) the value 
ascribed to online journalism by professional journalists, political actors, online activists, 
consumers both active and passive, it is important to acknowledge that these groups are 
themselves engaged in a struggle in which the stakes are the capacity to define dominant 
criteria of control. The upshot is that we should not only be open to different 
interpretations of online content made by professional journalists and non-professional 
bloggers, for instance; we should see such differences as structured, and not necessarily 
overt, claims for power. Such struggles may have democratising effects or lead to new 
spaces of citizenship, but there is no reason to assume that they will.  
 
Methodologically, it should be possible roughly to measure the cultural purchase of 
particular forms of online journalism: my initial research suggests that this should be done 
not by aggregating page impressions, responses or uptake in traditional media, but through 
qualitative analysis. This means in particular looking at the manner in which blog content is 
picked up on, with narratively or discursively normalized references to a blogger’s status or 
views, their decontesting appearance in expressions of common sense, humour or 
throwaway comments, and references out of context revealing far more than a response 
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from a recognised authority. Evidence of such cultural purchase does not simply mean that 
views expressed in online media production are gaining influence – or by extension, that 
this could be seen as democratic insofar as it represents wider, or at least different, 
representation. It could also be interpreted as signifying simply that power has moved from 
one site of media production to another. This is not in itself democratic; it represents a shift 
from one prevailing form of authority (Robinson 2007; Thurman 2008), roughly speaking, 
professional and institutional, to another deprofessionalized one which I have characterized 
here as being contingent upon projected authenticity. And while different groups may 
benefit from a new configuration of power relations, there is no reason to invest the shift 
itself with a teleology of democratising reform. Moreover, shifting centres of power in 
journalism, as well as the decentring of power, do not inevitably change what Bourdieu 
terms the game itself. New forms of cultural production emerge, as do distinct principles or 
economies for attributing value to cultural production. Such emergences may coincide with 
democratising trends, but there are no reasons, beyond the strategic or complicit, to locate 
the teleology of such trends in these new forms. 
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Notes 
 
                                               
1 This chapter will focus mainly on the democratising potential of non-professional „opinion‟ bloggers, as 
distinct from blogs maintained by professional journalists, linklogs and personal online journals (i.e. those 
lacking external observations). 
2 Bourdieu (1993) defines the field of cultural production thus: “The field of production and circulation of 
symbolic goods is defined as the system of objective relations among different instances, functionally 
defined by their role in the division of labour of production, reproduction and diffusion of symbolic goods.” 
More generally, it can be characterized as that space inhabited by individuals and groups who have a stake 
in producing, disseminating, legitimating and valorising information. 
3
 „Lifeworld‟ (Lebenswelt) is used in the Husserlian sense of a taken-for-granted stream of everyday 
routines, interactions and events that constitute individual and social experience, rather than Habermas‟s 
conception of shared understandings and values which develop over time through face-to-face 
communication in a social group. 
4 There are several counter-examples where bloggers have carried out significant investigative journalism, 
most notably in the reports leading up to the resignation of US Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent 
Lott. 
5 The following sites were surveyed in May 2008 and coded using NVivo: Guido Fawkes 
(http://www.order-order.com/); Oliver Kamm (www.oliverkamm.typepad.com); Chicken Yoghurt 
(www.chickyog.blogspot.com); Bloggerheads (www.bloggerheads.com); Samizdata 
(www.samizdata.net/blog/); Normblog (normblog.typepad.com); Harry's Place 
(hurryupharry.bloghouse.net); Slugger O'Toole (www.sluggerotoole.com); Conservative Commentary 
(concom.blogspot.com/); What You Can Get Away With (http://www.nickbarlow.com/blog/) 
6
 For Durkheim, the social must be explained not by the conceptions of its participants, but by the structural 
causes which elude awareness but which necessitate the phenomena observed by the social scientist. For 
Bourdieu (1977), all observed behaviour (including participants‟ conscious reflections) should be seen after 
Bachelard as „particular instances of the possible‟, ie specific expressions of common generative structures 
which are the key objects of social analysis. 
7
 Media Consumption and the Future of Public Connection, funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council and the Arts and Humanities Research Council’s Cultures of Consumption programme, grant 
number RES-143-25-0011. 
